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DDAS Accident Report 
 
Accident details 
Report date: 18/05/2006 Accident number: 190 
Accident time: 13:45 Accident Date: 30/01/1995 
Where it occurred: Phum Trach Pok, 
Sortnikum District, 
Siem Riep Province 
Country: Cambodia 
Primary cause: Management/control 
inadequacy (?) 
Secondary cause: Inadequate training (?)
Class: Excavation accident Date of main report: 16/02/1995 
ID original source: RMJ Name of source: CMAC 
Organisation: Name removed  
Mine/device: IED Ground condition: not recorded 
Date record created: 14/02/2004 Date  last modified: 14/02/2004 
No of victims: 2 No of documents: 2 
 
Map details 
Longitude:  Latitude:  
Alt. coord. system:  Coordinates fixed by:  
Map east:  Map north:  
Map scale: not recorded Map series:  
Map edition:  Map sheet:  
Map name:   
 
Accident Notes 
inadequate training (?) 
inadequate medical provision (?) 
safety distances ignored (?) 




At the time of the accident the demining group are believed to have operated in two-man 
teams with a one-man drill. In this one deminer used the detector and all the tools while his 
partner watched and "controlled" him. The demining group issued frontal protection and their 
drills assumed the deminer would kneel or squat while excavating.  
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A country MAC accident report dated 16th February 1995 was found on file at the MAC offices 
in January 1999. The following summarises its content.  
The mined area was laid by the District Police and Militia to protect a dyke from attack. The 
reconnaissance team warned of booby trapped 60mm mortars and B40 RPGs. At 13:45 on 
the day of the accident Victim No.1 located a device similar to one that had been found two 
hours before. He called his Section Commander to identify it. The Section Commander, 
Victim No.2, arrived and stood to his right behind him. The Section Commander removed his 
safety spectacles to wipe sweat from his eyes and get a better view. Victim No.1 began to 
probe again and Victim No.2 told him to stop. As he put the tool down, the device exploded. 
Both victims fell back into a cleared area.  
Victim No.1 "received the main force of the blast including fragmentation to the face and head 
as well as flash burns and peppering." He also received fragment wounds to the arms, 
suffered a broken arm and was bleeding heavily. Victim No.2 received a small number of 
fragment wounds, flash burns and peppering to his arms, upper body and face. His eyes were 
also damaged. After first-aid the victims left by ambulance at 13:55 and arrived at the Sotr 
Nikum District Hospital at 14:30. They were stabilised and then moved to Siem Reap 
Provincial Hospital and the following morning flown by a French military helicopter to Calmette 
Hospital in Phnom Penh. 
 
Conclusion 
The investigators concluded that the main device was a B40 RPG (inferred from fragments at 
the site and from the victims' report). Two other devices were found nearby which were B40 
rockets with the propellant removed. The head had been placed in the ground with an 
adjusted mortar fuse covered by plastic. Both were highly sensitive and placed to detonate in 
an anti-personnel role.  
Victim No.1 caused the accident by careless excavation, and by placing a tool on or close to 
the device. Both acts were a direct breach of the group's SOPs. 
The investigator believed that Victim No.1's eyes were saved by his safety spectacles 
because he was within a meter of the point of detonation yet they were intact.  Victim No.2 
was standing a meter behind the deminer and was not wearing his spectacles; he sustained 
injuries that "will most likely result in permanently impaired vision". The investigators argued 
that the "thick" full cotton uniform saved both men from severe flash and peppering injuries to 
their limbs and main body. The demining group announced that they intended to introduce full 
face visors and body armour during 1995. The investigators stated that a full face visor would 
have prevented many of the injuries in this accident. 
 
Recommendations 
The investigators found that no modification of SOPs was required but retraining of all 
deminers on relevant procedures was recommended. This accident was taken to demonstrate 
that the use of excessive disturbance around highly sensitive booby traps is unnecessarily 
dangerous. Where such devices are found the field officer should place two charges to 
detonate it as an alternative to further manual probing. 
Each of the group's deminers carried a field dressing. In this instance six dressings were used 
before the first aid box arrived. It was recommended that each deminer be equipped with two 
or three field dressings. The ambulance had one stretcher. It was recommended that it be 
modified to allow for two stretchers.  
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Victim Report 
Victim number: 240 Name: Name removed 
Age:  Gender: Male 
Status: deminer  Fit for work: yes 
Compensation: not made available Time to hospital: 45 minutes 
Protection issued: Safety spectacles Protection used: Safety spectacles 
 







See medical report. 
 
Medical report 
No formal medical report was made available. 
The accident report stated that Victim No.1 "received the main force of the blast including 
fragmentation to the face and head as well as flash burns and peppering." He also received 
fragment wounds to the arms, suffered a broken arm and was bleeding heavily. 
The victim returned to work with the demining group on 14th June 1995.  
 
Victim Report 
Victim number: 241 Name: Name removed 
Age:  Gender: Male 
Status: supervisory  Fit for work: not known 
Compensation: not made available Time to hospital: 45 minutes 
Protection issued: Safety spectacles Protection used: none 
 








See medical report. 
 
Medical report 
No formal medical report was made available. 
The accident report stated that Victim No.2 received a small number of fragment wounds, 
flash burns and peppering to his arms, upper body and face. His eyes were also damaged.  
 
Analysis 
The primary cause of the accident is listed as a "Management/control inadequacy" because a 
field controller was involved and (despite the investigator's opinion) was in breach of SOPs by 
removing his eye protection - and possibly also by allowing the deminer to work while he was 
too close.  
Management must take responsibility for ensuring that field supervisors are appropriately 
trained and obey their SOPs. The secondary cause is listed as “Inadequate training”. 
The failure to provide adequate eye protection was corrected soon after by this demining 
NGO.   
 
Related papers 
A sketch of the B40 improvised mine was available [it appears to be a P-40 Vietnamese mine, 
made using BLU-24/B submunitions.] 
One source indicated that both victims may have returned to work with the demining group on 
14th June 1995. It is not clear in what capacity Victim No.2 was re-employed, if he was.  
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